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Reproduction of Hierarchy?
A Social Network Analysis of the
American Law Professoriate
Daniel Martin Katz, Joshua R. Gubler, Jon Zelner,
Michael J. Bommarito II, Eric Provins, and Eitan Ingall
Which individual has the greater lasting impact upon the path of American
law: The median Supreme Court justice or an entrepreneurial law professor
at an institution with a high degree of centrality? Given that we are inclined
to support the former, we offer this provocative question not to provide a
definitive conclusion but rather to encourage greater incorporation of the
American legal academy in positive legal theory.
A growing body of work demonstrates that the perspectives held by these
legal elites, in their position as both repositories and distributors of legal
information, has consequences for American common law development.
Specifically, while we believe additional empirical and theoretical work is
needed, a deep relationship between the American legal academy and the
development of American law has been highlighted in a variety of recent
historical institutionalist scholarship. For example, leading scholars such as
Brandwein and Graber offer compelling qualitative evidence linking members
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of the American legal academy, including Christopher Langdell, James Parker
Hall and Zechariah Chafee, to the spread and/or survival of historically
questionable legal narratives.1
The mounting record2 raises serious questions about broader mechanisms
supporting the development and reproduction of “historical truth.”3 In an
effort to transition toward a more general model of intellectual diffusion, we
believe it is important to characterize the social structure of the American
legal professoriate. Its self-organization4 offers one possible causal mechanism
for the emergence of and convergence upon conceptions of what constitutes
a sound legal rule. Thus, we explore the architecture of the legal academy, the
relative authority of particular institutions, and prospects for diffusion across
its component institutions.
While many empirical approaches might be applied to the development
and spread of intellectual and doctrinal paradigms, one particularly useful
manner of representing the interactions between various entities across such a
1.

Brandwein identifies the case method as significant for locking in the dominant account of the
Waite Court’s state action jurisprudence. See Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment
of Blacks? Rethinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite Court, 41 Law & Soc’y Rev.
343, 374–375 (2007) (“So what did the case method mean for study of the Civil Rights Cases
(1883)? It meant that the decision was slated for study, isolated from legal materials crucial
for understanding the Waite Court’s ‘state action’ jurisprudence. This isolation can be seen
in the very first constitutional law casebook, the two-volume cases on Constitutional Law
(1895) by Thayer. …Thayer’s casebook thus exemplifies the practice of isolating the study of
the Civil Rights cases.”). Mark Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy
of Civil Libertarianism (Univ. of California Press 1991). In describing the development of
modern First Amendment theory, Graber highlights the pivotal role played by Harvard Law
Professor Zechariah Chafee.

2.

In addition to these important works, additional historical institutionalist scholarship exists
analyzing other important constitutional narratives. For example, consider the analysis
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Howard
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers
Jurisprudence (Duke 1992), as well as the examination of New Deal “Switch in Time,” Barry
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution
(Oxford 1998). Evaluating the record, these historical institutionalist scholars place longstanding and dominant accounts under significant stress.

3.

See Pamela Brandwein, Reconstructing Reconstruction: The Supreme Court and the
Production of Historical Truth (Duke 1999).

4.

Self-organization is a term of art commonly used to describe the collective behavior of a
variety of social and physical systems. While there exist slightly varying definitions, the term
is often used to describe a system whose behavior becomes increasingly organized without
being directly managed by an outside source. Examples of self-organization can be seen in
physical science fields such as chemistry (molecular self-assembly), physics (spontaneous
magnetization), and biology (homeostasis). Such ideas have also been invoked in the social
sciences to describe flocking behavior (sociology) and the behavior of markets (economics).
For example, the often-quoted Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek described capitalism
as a self-organizing system of voluntary cooperation. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, Am. Econ. Rev. Sept. 1945, at 519.
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complex adaptive system5 is network analysis. Drawing from available information
on each tenure-track professor employed by an ABA accredited institution,
Section II of this article applies and extends the framework used in Fowler,
Grofman & Masuoka.6 Our analysis reveals an extremely skewed distribution
of social authority—even more than is present in other intellectual disciplines
in the social sciences. As described herein, we believe this extreme skewing has
a variety of consequences including the ranking of institutions as well as the
broader development of American law.
As previously documented in literature, such a pattern does not arise
through happenstance. Rather, a range of mathematically derived micro-level
generating processes are plausibly responsible for producing various observed
macro structures. This pattern characterizes not only substantive decisional
outputs but also extends to self-organization of actors. Indeed, our findings
are consistent with the work of a variety of scholars,7 all of whom document
the tendency of common law systems and their constitutive institutions to selforganize in a “fractal,” “crystalline,” “highly-skewed,” and/or “scale-invariant”
manner.8
As we believe the acceptance or rejection of particular paradigms is, at
least in part, a function of the social spread of information, we draw from
literature in social epidemiology, and in Section III we provide a first-order
computational model for an information diffusion process. Our model
provides a parsimonious display of the tradeoff between idea infectiousness
and structural position within the network. The model demonstrates how,
for historically elite institutions, their structural position allows such schools
5.

A growing literature demonstrates that various components of American law display
properties consistent with a complex system. E.g., Daniel M. Katz & Derek K. Stafford,
Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 Ohio St.
L.J. 457 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 885 (2008);
Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in
Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 357 (2005); David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen,
How Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems,
29 J. Legal Stud. 545 (2000); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to
Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49
Vand. L. Rev. 1407 (1996).

6.

See James H. Fowler, Bernard N. Grofman & Natalie Masuoka, Social Networks in Political
Science: Hiring and Placement of PhDs, 1960–2002, PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol., Oct. 2007, at 729.

7.

E.g., Thomas A. Smith, The Web of the Law, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 309 (2007); Elizabeth A.
Leicht, et al., Large-Scale Structure of Time Evolving Citation Networks, 59 Eur. Physical
J. B. 75 (2007); Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation:
An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 848 (2005); Post
& Eisen, supra note 5; Jack Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1831,
1835–36 (1991).

8.

For example, in their consideration of the structure of the American federal judiciary and
an outline of one possible generating mechanism responsible for the extreme skewing
of authority, see Katz & Stafford, supra note 5. These authors isolate some variant of the
preferential attachment model first outlined in the physics literature; see Reka Albert
& Albert-László Barabási, Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks, 286 Science 509
(1999).
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to become intellectual super-spreaders. While our model is fairly simple, we
hope our foray into computational legal studies9 will, at a minimum, motivate
future scholarship.
1. Data Collection
In order to generate an empirically grounded picture of the social topology
of the American legal academy, we collected available information on the
tenured or tenure-track faculty of each institution accredited by the American
Bar Association (ABA) and listed in the U.S. News & World Report rankings.
While the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) produces a directory
of faculty members employed at various institutions, we decided to vet this
information by independently collecting data on each institution’s core
faculty. This direct collection effort was undertaken during the early spring
of 2008.10 Although time consuming, this process proved fruitful, as virtually
every institution maintains a detailed online listing of its faculty. Therefore,
using publicly available web pages, it was possible on the first cut to obtain
relevant information on virtually every tenured or tenure-track professor.11 In
the rare instance that we could not ascertain the exact employment status of
a listed faculty member, we relied on secondary sources to determine whether
to include a particular individual. Such adjudicating information included
the professor’s exact title, nature of their scholarship, and the content of their
recently taught courses.12 Each line of the dataset was independently vetted by
at least two coders.
9.

Computational legal studies is a sub-field dedicated to applying tools from computer
science, applied physics, informatics, complex systems and applied mathematics to help
enrich positive legal theory. See http://computationallegalstudies.com/. The approaches
highlighted herein are but a small slice of the wider set of available methods. Such
tools include agent based modeling, network analysis, machine learning, evolutionary
computation, natural language processing, and data mining. While the approaches have
analogs to traditional techniques, there are important distinctions between commonly
used analytical methods and a computational legal studies approach. For recent relevant
work outlining the new age of “computational social science,” see David Lazer, et al.,
Computational Social Science, 323 Science 721 (2009). A special themed issue of Science
Magazine entitled “Complex Systems & Networks” was recently devoted to methods
relevant to the field. See, e.g., Adrian Cho, Ourselves and Our Interactions, 325 Science
406 (2009); Albert-László Barabási, Scale-Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond, 325
Science 412 (2009); Carter Butts, Revisiting Foundations of Network Analysis, 325 Science
414 (2009); Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of SocialEcological Systems, 325 Science 419 (2009); Alessandro Vespignani, Predicting the Behavior
of Techno-Social Systems, 325 Science 425 (2009).

10.

We selected this mid-year period for the information acquisition as it was least likely to
overlap with faculty turnover.

11.

We excluded from our analysis all non-tenure track professors including legal writing,
clinical professors, lecturers, and adjunct instructors.

12.

In a very limited number of instances, it was necessary to rely upon external sources such
as Martindale-Hubbell. We cross-referenced that information using a variety of web based
querying techniques.
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Appendix I infra contains a selected sample of our data set. As Appendix
I illustrates, the broader data includes specific information on the academic
institution where the individual earned his or her first American law degree.
Our data also includes a significant and growing population of individuals
who possess no American law degree. These individuals fall primarily into
two categories: those who exclusively possess legal training from a non-US
institution,13 or individuals who obtained a Ph.D. in an academic field but did
not earn a U.S. law degree.14 While we included these individuals in the dataset,
we excluded from our analysis all individuals who did not possess some form
of American law degree (J.D., L.L.B., L.L.M., or S.J.D.). Consistent with
our broader strategy, joint J.D./Ph.D.’s were indexed using the institution
that granted their primary law degree. Particularly among historically elite
institutions, the data contained a large number of self-loops (i.e., individuals
employed at the same institution they formerly attended).15 We followed the
approach of Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka who explicitly decided against the
inclusion of self-loops in the study of political science hiring and placement.16
In sum, our process yielded a significant dataset containing information on the
more than 7,200 legal academics and 184 institutions that together comprise
the American legal academy.
With the information acquired, we sought to analyze the patterns contained
therein. Despite being largely decentralized—with decisions being rendered
independently at each respective institution—we suspected a broad pattern
would emerge. Indeed, given the prior evidence17 we suspected the academy
would self-organize in a relatively hierarchical manner. However, the extent
of this self-organized hierarchy was one of the questions we sought to answer.
13.

The majority of such institutions where located in the United Kingdom, Canada or
Australia.

14.

A function of the rise of both the law and economics and empirical legal studies movements,
a majority of such individuals held a Ph.D. in either Political Science or Economics.

15.

Loops are located in the diagonal of the adjacency matrix A: = aij : m×n where a loop occurs
when i = j. For relevant work on such self-loops see Ted Eisenberg & Martin Wells, Inbreeding
in Law School Hiring: Assessing the Performance of Faculty Hired from Within, 29 J. of
Leg. Stud. 369 (2000).

16.

Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka, supra note 6. Given the small number of self-loops present
in political science, their exclusion from the prior study was entirely sensible. Although
there are certainly more self-loops in law professor hiring and placement, we still believe
their exclusion is appropriate as many of the loops are concentrated at historically elite
institutions. Thus, if anything, their omission should downwardly weight the authority of
these law schools, yielding conservative estimates of the concentration of authority as well
as the relative strength of such key institutions.

17.

E.g., Richard E. Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the
Professoriate and its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. Legal Educ. 594 (2003); Robert
J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile of the
Nation’s Law Professors, 25 Mich. J. L. Reform 191 (1991); Jerome A. Barron & Elyce H.
Zenoff, So You Want to Hire a Law Professor? 33 J. Legal Educ. 492 (1983).
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II. A Network Representation of Hiring and Placement
Within the American Law Professoriate
While traditionally the province of mathematical sociology, the study of
networks has recently been performed by scholars across the physical and
social sciences. Indeed, network science is a genuinely interdisciplinary field
as it draws scholars from wide ranging disciplines including physics, political
science, applied mathematics, biology, computer science and economics. While
certainly not yet part of the mainstream legal literature, there have been a series
of recent articles applying elements of network science to various substantive
domains including patents,18 telecommunications regulation,19 judicial
decision making,20 and the structure of the law.21 Using the data described
above and leveraging analytical techniques from the broader network science
literature, we sought to first map the internal social structure of the American
legal academy, and second consider implications of that structure for the
development of the law.
Networks generally consist of two primary components—nodes and edges. In
social science applications, nodes typically represent actors or institutions,
while edges represent connections between such entities. Edges can be either
directed, to represent connections that flow from one node to another, or
undirected. They can simply signify the existence of a connection, taking on
a discrete value of 0 or 1, or they can be weighted to reflect the strength of the
connection between two nodes. Edges can represent a wide class of potential
connections including social ties, the flow of goods between firms or countries,
and the linkages between various actors or institutions.
Given a reasonably well-specified network topology, it is possible to develop
a model of diffusion for a particular pathogen. For example, networks are often
used as the architecture in social epidemiology models, where the relevant
pathogen could be a virus such as the swine flu or the norovirus. Using a
similar approach, it is also possible to consider the spread of particular ideas or
social norms within a given system where most ideas or norms do not succeed
but a few persist and become reasonably well accepted.
A precursor to considering the spread of ideas and norms is the
characterization of the relevant network architecture. Thus, in a manner
18.

See Katherine J. Strandburg, Gabor Csardi, Jan Tobochnik, Peter Erdi & Laszlo Zalanyi,
Patent Citation Networks Revisited: Signs of a Twenty-First Century Change?, 87 N. C.
L. Rev. 1657 (2009); Katherine J. Strandburg, Gabor Csardi, Jan Tobochnik, Peter Erdi &
Laszlo Zalanyi, Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the
“Patent Explosion,” 21 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1293 (2007).

19.

Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex
Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1687 (2005).

20.

Katz & Stafford, supra note 8; Daniel Katz, Derek Stafford & Eric Provins, Social Architecture,
Judicial Peer Effects and the 'Evolution' of the Law: Toward a Positive Theory of Judicial
Social Structure, 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 975 (2008).

21.

Michael James Bommarito II, et al., Distance Measures for Dynamic Citation Networks,
389 Physica A 4201 (2010); Smith, supra note 7.
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consistent with the approach undertaken by Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka,22
we transformed our dataset into a set of directed dyadic relations between the
institution where a given individual received their initial socialization and the
institution where that individual now acts to socialize the next generation.23
Figure 1 offers a discrete example of the transition from the dataset to a graph
theoretic representation.
Figure 1. From a Data Set to a Graph-Theoretic Representation

While Figure 1 offers a clear representation of individual entry, it is virtually
impossible to manually visualize the type of large-scale dataset we consider
herein. However, recent developments in computer science, physics and
mathematical sociology allow for the algorithmic visualization of networks
of significant size. We used a spring embedded, force directed placement
algorithm24 commonly used by scholars to visualize networks roughly the
size of the American law professoriate. This automated placement algorithm
is useful because it typically produces graphs with attractive properties such
as minimized edge crossings, efficient use of the planar area, and minimized
difference in edge lengths. Applying the Kamada-Kawai approach, Figure 2
offers a representation of the full-directed network of hiring and placement.
Figure 2 conveys a significant amount of information in a single
visualization. Each institution is sized by total number of placements. Thus,
the nodes representing top placing institutions such as Harvard are large while
institutions such as Ave Maria are quite small. Additionally, the location of the
nodes in the graph is a function of the "quality" of its respective placements.
Schools with higher quality placements are closer to the center of the network
while schools that are closer to the boundary feature less prominent placements.
22.

Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka, supra note 6.

23.

In graph-theoretic terms, we used a weighted and directed unipartite graph.

24.

This was developed by Eades and further by Kamada & Kawai (1989). See Peter Eades, A
Heuristic for Graph Drawing, 42 Congressus Numerantium 149 (1984); Tomishia Kamada &
Satoru Kawai, An Algorithm for Drawing General Undirected Graphs, 31 Info. Processing
Letters 7 (1989).
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In their mapping of the hiring and placement of political science Ph.D.’s,
Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka note “our graphical representations clearly show
the structure of the discipline in terms of what might be conceived of as a coreperiphery network.”25 Figure 2 shows an analogous structure for the American
legal academy, as a fairly small core of elite law schools distinguish themselves
with their positions of high structural importance within the broader network.
Indeed, broadly considered, Figure 2 displays a fairly dense set of core
institutions occupying a highly central network position.
Figure 2. The Hiring and Placement Network for the
American Law Professoriate26

Through an alternative representation, Figure 3 demonstrates the
dominance of an isolated number of institutions. This visualization yields
a hierarchical depiction of the network—a representation that helps uncover
latent distribution of authority contained therein. While Figure 3 bunches
a large number of institutions into its base, it is important to note this
crowding is data-driven. Namely, it yields a visualization of the data that
does justice to the relative distances between institutions. Consistent with
25.

See supra note 6; see also Stephen Borgatti & M.G. Everett, Models of Core/Periphery
Structures, Soc. Networks, 1999, at 375; Michael G. Bisciglia, Scott L. Feld & Marcus
Ynalvez, Why Your Department Has Placed Fewer Students Than The One That Trained
You: Principles of Directed Mobility as a Consequence of In-Out Variation (La. St. U.
Dep’t. Soc., Working Paper, 2003).

26.

To view a high quality color rendering of this image and other related supplementary
materials, please visit http://computationallegalstudies.com/jle-law-prof-article/.
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the degree distribution discussed below as well as prior scholarship,27 Figure
3 provides some visual indication of an important difference between hiring
and placement in political science with hiring and placement within the legal
academy. Namely, unlike departments of political science,28 the aggregation
of all individual-level decisions by law hiring committees converges not upon
a cluster of institutions but rather upon two institutions—Harvard and Yale.29
Figure 3. A Hierarchical View of the Hiring & Placement Network30

III. The Network Structure of the American Law Professoriate:
Node Level Centrality Measures
While the automated graph visualization techniques used to generate Figure
2 and Figure 3 are useful for observing the relative placement of institutions as
well as the broad compositional properties of a given network, the literature
recognizes that these approaches are only heuristic representations of the
27.

E.g., Redding, supra note 17.

28.

Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka, supra note 6.

29.

As our interest is in simply the raw number of placements, we do not control for institutional
size. Thus, the visualization in Figure 3 undoubtedly favors an institution such Harvard
whose class size far exceeds that of Yale.

30.

To view a high quality color rendering of this image and other related supplementary
materials please visit http://computationallegalstudies.com/jle-law-prof-article/.
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underlying structure.31 To best characterize a given network, scholars apply
statistical techniques developed in the network science literature, as these
metrics offer transparent and replicable depictions of the underlying data.
Prior studies of the American law professoriate, including Leiter,32 employ
an individual level approach seeking to consider the “best law schools for
the ‘best’ jobs in law teaching.” This individual level approach is typically
considered through the eyes of an applicant asking in probabilistic terms,
“which institution gives me the best chance to secure a top level law teaching
job?” Considering this question, scholars such Leiter typically control for
characteristics such as institutional size. One potential shortcoming of this
approach surrounds questions of functional form. Namely, it is not clear that
placements linearly scale to differences in the size of graduating classes. In
other words, it is not clear that simply dividing placements by number of
yearly graduates per school represents the appropriate specification.
Bracketing the specification problem, if the question were restructured to
consider hiring and placement at the institutional level, all else equal, size is
simply a factor endowment where the sheer volume of graduates produced
by certain institutions may allow ideas generated at those institutions to
outperform the ideas generated at their smaller counterparts. With this caveat
in Tables 1–3, we offer three traditional node level centrality measures useful
for determining the relative standing of various institutions: OutDegree, Hub
Score and Closeness.33 Each measure employs a different criterion to assess the
relative strength of each individual law school. Tables 1–3 below display these
differential rankings.
As the existing network is an artifact of votes over the applicants minted
from various institutions at various time periods, there is likely some rough
mapping to faculty quality in these aggregate decisions. Yet, it is important to
remember that our analysis omits consideration of other factors relevant to a
comprehensive analysis including various bibliometric measures of intellectual
prowess. Indeed, faculty quality is a question with multiple dimensions
31.

Specifically, the Kamada-Kawai Layout employs a heuristic approach to placement where
only a single vertex is seated at a given time. A given vertex is chosen to be the “most
promising” vertex with the maximum gradient value of

Once the vertex to be moved (m) is chosen all other vertices are fixed and the energy is (locally)
minimized by only moving vertex m. This is done using a single-sided, two-dimensional
Newton-Raphson iteration. To find the root of a function f (x) in one dimension, NewtonRaphson iterates:

32.

Brian Leiter, Brian Leiter’s Best Law Schools for the “Best” Jobs in Law Teaching, May 25,
2006, available at http://www.leiterrankings.com/jobs/2006job_teaching.shtml.

33.

See Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka, supra note 6. For reasons cited, we do not calculate either
eigenvector centrality or one of the many variations of Google’s “Page Rank” Algorithm.
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including but not limited to quality of academic training, quality of intellect,
work ethic, intellectual curiosity as well as a wide number of other individual,
structural, and stochastic factors.
Our analysis is an initial attempt to measure the structural position of
various institutions because all else equal, the patterns displayed in such a
network offer an initial indication of one class of intellectual diffusion that
could be plausibly anticipated. While there certainly exist other social and
professional networks of legal elites capable of supporting the diffusion of
ideas, we believe this article represents a worthwhile contribution to a broader
model of intellectual diffusion within American law. Thus, the analysis
presented herein should be considered the beginning and not the end of such
a discussion.
A. Calculating OutDegree
With all of its well-documented faults,34 U.S. News purports to provide
a composite picture for an institution—one where faculty quality at best
represents only a component of broader inquiry.35 While imperfect in some
respects, we believe our measure compares favorably to the qualitative survey
used to generate the U.S. News peer assessment. Namely, surveys seek to capture
opinion, but given that talk is cheap, it is unclear whether the preferences
stated in a survey actually map to observed behavior. In this respect, our
measure is useful because it represents aggregate revealed preferences over
institutions and is generated in a context where a significant commitment of
financial resources hangs in the balance.
Each placement from one law school to another constitutes a direct
and directed connection between the schools.36 In a directed network, the
outdegree is the tally of all connections emanating from a given institution.
When we remove loops from the network (i.e. cases where a professor teaches
at the same institution where he or she received training), Harvard Law School
has outdegree = 993 while nine law schools have outdegree = 0. In that vein,
although blunt in some respects, outdegree provides a glimpse into the relative
standing of each institution.
34.

See Jeffrey Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and Resource
Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 89 Ind. L. J. 229 (2006). As an example of the wider
critical literature, the author offers perhaps the most stinging indictment of the U.S. News
Rankings.

35.

For a useful description of the U.S. News Rankings, see Theodore P. Seto, Understanding
the U.S. News Law School Rankings, 60 SMU L. Rev. 493 (2007).

36.

The outdegree of a node ni is a count of the number of arcs (directed connections) emanating
from ni. Formally, Wasserman & Faust define outdegree, d0 (ni), as the “number of arcs of
the form lk = <ni,nj> for all lk ∈ L and all nj ∈ N” (126). See Stanley Wasserman & Katherine
Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge 1994).
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In Table 1 below, we display the Top 50 institutions as measured by outdegree.
For purposes of comparison, we include a rank of each institution using its
“peer assessment” score.37 While generally similar for many institutions, our
approach provides non-trivial differences from U.S. News for several institutions.
For example, as Table 1 indicates institutions such as Syracuse, Wayne State,
Howard, and Northeastern University Law School far outperform their U.S.
News peer assessment.
As a measure of potential structural influence, however, outdegree has a
serious drawback: It provides all connections incident to each vertex equal
weight. As such, it does not differentiate a link between Harvard and Ave
Maria from a link between Harvard and Michigan. Thus, outdegree does
not account for the varying prestige levels of the nodes from which the
connections originate or for the prestige of the nodes in which connections
terminate. The well-known Kleinberg’s “Hubs and Authorities” algorithm, an
approach similar to Google’s PageRank™, represents an attempt to remedy
this problem.
B. Calculating Hubs and Authorities
Kleinberg has noted the above problem with count measures such as
outdegree. Namely, standard degree measures do not account for the social
standing of nodes to which arcs connect. To remedy this shortcoming,
Kleinberg defines two types of nodes, “hubs” and “authorities.” Hubs are
nodes with many placements to other high prestige nodes. Authorities are
nodes that receive (or hire) from high prestige nodes. Designed to consider
dispersal of influence within the world-wide-web, the “hub and authority”
value the Kleinberg algorithm assigns is a function of the social prestige of its
neighbors. As noted by Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka,39 a “good hub points
to many good authorities, and a good authority is pointed to by many good
hubs.” In other words, hubs are the schools with a high degree of influence
on other influential schools within the network. Therefore, this measure better
represents the relative influence of various nodes within a network.40
Given the specific nature of the institutions in question, we are interested
primarily in recording Kleinberg’s “hub” values for each node in our network.
Authority scores are not reported in this article because their substantive
meaning is not useful for purposes of this social inquiry. While certain
38

37.

Using solely the “peer assessment,” we assigned each institution a rank based upon their
relative performance. This includes assigning ranks to institutions located in the third and
fourth tier. If two or more institutions were tied, we assigned each institution the highest
possible rank.

38.

See Jon Kleinberg, Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment, 46 J. Ass’n
Computing Machinery 668 (1999).

39.

See Fowler, Grofman & Masuoka, supra note 6.

40.

We implemented the Kleinberg algorithm in the statistical program R using the igraph
package. For access to the igraph package see The Igraph Library, available at http://igraph.
sourceforge.net/.
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institutions display local variation, Table 2 illustrates how the consideration of
placement quality does not dramatically alter the qualitative results.
Like all measures of influence and social structure, however, Kleinberg’s
measure has its limitations. By placing additional weight on the ties between
influential nodes within a network, “hubs and authorities” values do not
account for the potential impact of a node that has neither high hiring nor
placement capacity, but has otherwise hired from central nodes. Our final
measure of influence attempts to capture this important dimension.
C. Calculating Closeness
The last influence measure we calculate is closeness.41 The closeness score of
a given institution is simply a calculation of the shortest paths from that node
to all other nodes in the network. This calculation is usually normalized so the
score lies on a common spectrum between 0 and 1.42
Unlike the previous two measures, closeness directly accounts for a node’s
position in the network. According to our measure, closeness centrality is
greater for nodes that are more important to the structure of the network,
having shorter network distances to other nodes on average. As a measure
of social centrality, closeness is not without it own limitations. Namely, it is
theoretically possible for an institution to feature few connections (out degree)
and relatively low individual prestige (hubs), but still display a relatively high
closeness score. In particular, if the institution possesses a particular set of
placements, relative to the balance of the graph, its closeness score will far
outstrip its scoring under alternative measures. This differential is still
substantively valuable for diffusion as the spread of information throughout
the network may very well be accelerated by passing through such an
institution.43 However, we believe closeness, like its counterpart measures of
centrality, should not form the unilateral basis for characterizing a given node.
41.

Closeness relies upon the calculation of geodesic paths. A geodesic path, dG , is the shortest
path between two nodes within a network—with travel between nodes limited to the arcs (or
edges) that comprise the network. Formally, it is calculated as follows:

42.

The calculation we employ here is the normalized reciprocal of the formula provided in
Wasserman and Faust. See Wasserman & Faust, supra note 36. We employ this measure
for two reasons: 1) the normalized nature of the measure allows for easier comparison of
closeness scores across networks, and 2) the reciprocal has now become the most common
formula.

43.

In calculating closeness, we do not weight the arcs between nodes as we are concerned the
weighting of the arcs based on our pre-conceived idea of network structure would bias our
results.
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Table 1. Top Fifty Institutions Ranked By Out Degree
Out Degree
Rank

U.S. News Peer
Assessment Score
(2008)

Raw Out
Degree

Institution

1

1

993

Harvard

2

1

712

Yale

3

5

309

Michigan

4

4

308

Columbia

5

5

288

Chicago

6

8

245

NYU

7

1

217

Stanford

8

8

201

Berkeley

9

5

154

Virginia

10

10

154

Georgetown

11

10

152

Penn

12

14

111

Northwestern

13

15

111

Texas

14

10

91

Duke

15

19

87

UCLA

16

10

83

Cornell

17

28

82

Wisconsin

18

28

67

Boston University

19

24

59

Illinois

20

28

57

Minnesota

21

24

55

Iowa

22

41

53

Florida

23

19

50

George Washington

24

16

45

Vanderbilt

25

34

43

Tulane

26

28

42

Indiana

27

24

38

UC Hastings

28

24

36

Boston College

29

28

35

USC

30

19

35

UNC

31

35

34

Ohio State

32

19

32

Notre Dame

33

82

32

Northeastern
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34

56

30

Case Western

35

19

29

Emory

36

56

29

Temple

37

72

28

Miami

38

106

26

Howard

39

72

26

Syracuse

40

82

25

Rutgers-Camden

41

106

24

Wayne State

42

41

23

Georgia

43

47

23

Maryland

44

56

23

Kansas

45

28

22

William & Mary

46

64

22

Kentucky

47

17

21

Washington & Lee

48

47

21

American

49

72

21

Pittsburgh

50

64

21

Utah

Table 2. Top Fifty Institutions Ranked by Hub Score
Hub Score Rank

U.S. News Peer
Assessment Score (2008)

Hub Score

Institution

1

1

1.0000000

Harvard

2

1

0.9048631

Yale

3

5

0.8511497

Michigan

4

4

0.7952253

Columbia

5

5

0.7737389

Chicago

6

8

0.7026757

NYU

7

1

0.6668868

Stanford

8

8

0.6607399

Berkeley

9

10

0.6457157

Penn

10

10

0.6255498

Georgetown

11

5

0.5854464

Virginia

12

14

0.5014904

Northwestern

13

10

0.4138745

Duke

14

10

0.4075353

Cornell

15

15

0.3977734

Texas
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16

28

0.3787268

Wisconsin

17

19

0.3273598

UCLA

18

24

0.2959581

Illinois

19

28

0.2919847

Boston University

20

28

0.2513371

Minnesota

21

24

0.2403289

Iowa

22

28

0.2275534

Indiana

23

19

0.2235015

George Washington

24

16

0.2174677

Vanderbilt

25

41

0.2012442

Florida

26

24

0.1999686

UC Hastings

27

34

0.1974877

Tulane

28

28

0.1749897

USC

29

35

0.1702638

Ohio State

30

24

0.1586516

Boston College

31

72

0.1543831

Syracuse

32

19

0.1537236

UNC

33

56

0.1525355

Case Western

34

82

0.1511569

Northeastern

35

19

0.1428239

Notre Dame

36

56

0.1286375

Temple

37

82

0.1232289

Rutgers Camden

38

56

0.1227421

Kansas

39

64

0.1213358

Connecticut

40

47

0.1198901

American

41

34

0.1162101

Fordham

42

64

0.1150860

Kentucky

43

106

0.1148082

Howard

44

47

0.1125957

Maryland

45

28

0.1101975

William & Mary

46

56

0.1058079

Colorado

47

19

0.1041129

Emory

48

17

0.1031490

Washington & Lee

49

72

0.1027442

Miami

50

103

0.1006172

SUNY Buffalo
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Table 3. Top Fifty Institutions Ranked by Closeness Score

Closeness Rank

U.S.News Peer
Assessment Score
(2008)

Closeness Score

Institution

1

1

0.910447

Harvard

2

1

0.835614

Yale

3

5

0.806167

Michigan

4

5

0.759336

Chicago

5

4

0.759336

Columbia

6

8

0.726190

NYU

7

1

0.698473

Stanford

8

8

0.698473

Berkeley

9

10

0.693181

Georgetown

10

10

0.687969

Penn

11

5

0.670329

Virginia

12

14

0.635416

Northwestern

13

10

0.61

Duke

14

15

0.61

Texas

15

10

0.6

Cornell

16

28

0.6

Wisconsin

17

19

0.580952

UCLA

18

24

0.571875

Illinois

19

28

0.564814

Minnesota

20

28

0.563076

Boston University

21

19

0.556231

George Washington

22

34

0.551204

Tulane

23

24

0.547904

Iowa

24

28

0.547904

Indiana

25

28

0.536656

USC

26

82

0.527377

Rutgers Camden

27

35

0.524355

Ohio State

28

24

0.516949

UC Hastings

29

106

0.514044

Howard

30

56

0.511173

Case Western

31

28

0.509749

William & Mary

32

16

0.505524

Vanderbilt

33

41

0.501369

Florida
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34

19

0.501369

UNC

35

64

0.497282

Connecticut

36

72

0.484127

Syracuse

37

64

0.480315

Nebraska

38

47

0.480315

Missouri

39

34

0.479057

Washington

40

72

0.476562

Cardozo Yeshiva

41

72

0.474093

Miami

42

56

0.472868

Kansas

43

47

0.471649

Maryland

44

24

0.470437

Boston College

45

82

0.464467

Cincinnati

46

56

0.463291

Temple

47

72

0.4575

Loyola LA

48

72

0.4563591

Catholic

49

56

0.4563591

Colorado

50

19

0.4507389

Notre Dame

IV. The Network Structure of the American Law Professoriate:
Broad Structural Properties
Beyond providing characterizations at the node level, we consider the
manner in which global social authority is distributed, to provide potential
insight into the nature of self-organization embraced by the broader social
system. Specifically, it is important to remember that a given social structure
need not assume any particular form. Instead, the aggregate topology of the
network is a function of both the micro-level interactions between agents and
the feedback processes that flow over the entire network. Despite the wide
range of theoretical possibilities, such micro-interactions often follow patterns
that are traceable to a discrete set of generative processes.
In allied work considering the self-organization of federal judges,44 Katz,
Stafford, and Provins offer a summary of some common network structures—
including their degree distributions and likely micro-level generating
mechanisms. Drawing from the network science literature, the authors describe
four classic dependence graphs: Random, Clustered, Small World, and ScaleFree. Given that it can be difficult to adjudicate between these potential “states
of the world,” the extant literature has developed methods to characterize an
observed network. Since each of these graphs is associated with a particular
44.

See Katz, Stafford & Provins, supra note 20.
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distribution of authority, the most common approach is to determine the
number of connections held by each node and then plot distribution of those
“degrees” across all nodes.
Taken together, scholars have offered empirical evidence supporting
broad hypotheses about the highly skewed and/or fractal properties of legal
systems.45 Relying upon this earlier scholarship, we suspected the distribution
of authority present in hiring and placement would likely mimic the previously
documented pattern of extreme skewing.46 To test this hypothesis, we plotted
the distribution of authority for the institutions that together constitute the
American legal academy. Figure 4 is a frequency distribution plot of the law
schools by outdegree—where the outdegree is a count of the arcs incident
to each node. From this plot, the classic the L-shaped curve consistent with
extreme skewing emerges.
Figure 4. The Degree Distribution for the American Law Professoriate

In a large number of social and physical networks, including the mapping
of authority within the American legal academy, the distribution of outdegrees
is concentrated over a small subset of actors. While this “highly-skewed”
distribution of degrees is most commonly associated with the power law
distribution, a wide array of other closely linked distributions including the
exponential, the power law with cutoff and log-linear distribution have a similar
appearance.47 One way to distinguish between these potential alternatives is
45.

E.g., Post & Eisen, supra note 5; Smith, supra note 7; Katz & Stafford, supra note 8.

46.

One important class of skewed distributions, power law distributions, has been quite well
documented in the applied math and physics literature. Such distributions display a very
particular form of negative linear relationship.

47.

Aaron Clauset, M.E.J. Newman & Cosma R. Shalizi, Power-Laws Distributions in
Empirical Data, 51 SIAM Review 661 (2009) (offering a detailed description of these various
distributions).
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to plot the degree distribution on a log-log plot and measure its slope. Thus,
in Figure 5, we generated a histogram of the degree frequencies and then took
the log of the x and y-axis. This representation offers a log-log plot where the
tail is fairly noisy.48
Figure 5. The Log-Log of the Degree Distribution for
the American Law Professoriate

While characterizing the outdegree distribution may appear to be somewhat
esoteric, there is a deeper substantive point at stake in the above analysis. One
immediate implication of such an extremely skewed distribution is that use of
serial ranks (i.e. 1, 2, 3) to describe the distances between institutions is likely
to substantially obscure the actual distances between institutions. While ranks
simply imply ordering, common experience indicates that end users tend to
conflate them with linearized distance between units. Under some conditions,
the use of a linear heuristic is not particularly problematic. However, this is
not one of those cases. The plots displayed above taken together with the
48.

It is important to note that given the relatively small size of the network, we cannot
definitively characterize the distribution of authority. However, both Figure 4 and Figure
5 display a level of decline consistent with a highly-skewed degree distribution. Recent
developments in the network science literature provide significant improvements on a mere
visual assessment. For example, one technique uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
to allow for differentiation between the various flavors of highly skewed distributions. See
M.E.J. Newman, Power Laws, Pareto Distributions and Zipf’s Law, 46 Contemporary
Physics 323 (2005). The use of this procedure is typically employed to determine whether
a given plot is power law distributed. Using this approach, the alpha for the American law
professoriate network is {-1.93}—just outside of the traditional -2< α <-3 power law range—but
certainly consistent with the previous pattern of extreme skewing documented in studies
such as Post & Eisen, supra note 5; Smith, supra note 7; and Katz & Stafford, supra note 8.
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visualization shown in Figure 3 represent concrete evidence of the nonstationary distances that exist between certain sets of institutions. In other
words, focusing exclusively on the question of law professor placement,49 if
one were to consider the actual distances rather than the ordinal distances
between the institutions, their spacing features combinations of exponential
and trivial gaps between institutions.
V. A Computational Model of Intellectual Diffusion
Across the American Legal Academy
While the structure of the American legal academy defined herein is useful
for identifying central actors as well as the relative distribution of authority, it is
also serves as the foundation from which to consider the spread of information
including doctrines and intellectual paradigms across its agents and institutions.
Modeling the social spread of information is a difficult proposition as there
exist many separate channels over which the relevant information pathogen
might spread. While the diffusion of information from educational institution
to student represents an important channel of information dissemination,
even within a given institution not every student receives instruction from the
same set of faculty. In addition, we believe legal socialization is only one of a
broader set of possible diffusion mechanisms. For example, ideas are spread
through many online platforms such as the SSRN, the legal blogosphere, as
well as various email list servs. Additionally, conceptions of law are spread
through various professional organizations including the Society for Empirical
Legal Studies, American Society for Legal History, Society for Evolutionary
Analysis in Law, American Law and Economics Association, as well as various
components of the Association of American Law Schools.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we still believe the structure of
the American law professoriate is directly relevant to the development of
movements within law. Although we recognize computational models are
still unfamiliar to most legal scholars, we introduce this modeling framework
as we believe it might be usefully applied in the exploration of a variety of
other theoretical questions. Under the umbrella of applied complexity theory,
computational models have gained significant acceptance in fields such as
evolutionary biology, physics, computer science, and engineering. While the
social sciences have historically lagged, recent scholarship50 offers reason to
believe that generative social science is a modeling paradigm whose time has
come.
49.

It is important to note that unlike traditional academic departments such as political science,
physics or anthropology the educational mission of a law school is not necessarily aimed
at producing legal academics. Thus, institutions that rarely place a law professor may be
highly successful in their mission of training students to be effective lawyers. The evidence
presented herein only regards distances between institutions on the specific dimension in
question.

50.

E.g., Joshua M. Epstein, Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Computational
Modeling (Princeton 2007); John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptive Systems:
An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life (Princeton 2007).
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As many have observed,51 the common law is a complex adaptive system
in which an array of agents, institutions, and social contexts together act to
produce its substantive jurisprudence. In the face of such complexity, it is
tempting to assert that doctrinal transformations or the rise of intellectual
paradigms are either entirely stochastic or the byproduct of some ill-defined set
of social forces. In our estimation, the invocation of the “larger social forces”
catchall has, for far too long, served as an end point for analysis. Developments
in a wide variety of disciplines suggest an alternative. Specifically, while
complex mechanisms are undoubtedly responsible for producing changes in
the common law, this does not preclude a rigorous effort to understand the
mechanics of such social processes using the best available analytical methods.
By embedding our empirical network into a computational model, it
is possible to think concretely about how existing patterns of connections
operate to increase or decrease the probability of reasonably wide spread
acceptance. We choose a model of diffusion that weights parsimony over
model complexity. Although our approach does not incorporate factors such
as differential host susceptibility, countervailing information, and differential
institutional "recovery" times, we believe it provides a useful first approximation
of the dynamics of intellectual diffusion. Furthermore, given the static nature
of our data set, we do not model network evolution or the type of social sorting
considered by others.52 We encourage future research designed to incorporate
these important elements. In sum, while our approach represents a first cut,
it does provide clean, tractable results and is consistent with the well-studied
Reed-Frost model often used in epidemiology.53
We posit a mechanism of intellectual influence in which school B may be
infected by an idea from another school A with probability, p, if an individual
minted in A is hired as a faculty member for school B. This mechanism
encompasses two distinct forms of potential influence. First, it models the
impact of legal socialization. Legal socialization and the broader impacts of
the law school experience have been considered by a variety of scholars.54 In
addition to the direct impact of legal education, our mechanism accounts
for the role of former teachers as signal givers to their progeny. Namely, all
else equal, and particularly prior to the receipt of tenure, we believe former
students tend to contribute to the intellectual agenda outlined by their former
51.

See supra note 5.

52.

E.g., Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956);
Ken Kollman, John H. Miller & Scott Page, Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout
Model, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. 977 (1997). By social sorting, we are contemplating the sort of
intellectual homophily generated when individuals with similar intellectual commitments
gravitate to the same institution.

53.

For a classic examination of the Reed-Frost model, see H. Abbey, An Examination of the
Reed-Frost Theory of Epidemics, 24 Hum. Biology 201 (1952).

54.

E.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic
Against the System (Afar 1983); and Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School:
Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” (Oxford 2007).
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professors, as conformity is easier than intellectual insurgency. Thus, if school
A is a particularly successful at placing its students at many institutions (i.e.,
it features a strong hub score) this bodes well for the survival and diffusion of
ideas starting at school A.55
We make the unrealistic assumption that all placed individuals are
uniformly effective (and motivated) carriers of all ideas emanating from their
"minting" institution. It is unclear whether this simplification has a strong
influence on the explanatory and predictive power of the model with respect
to the diffusion of actual ideas, but this question would be most appropriately
treated in the context of an empirical case study, in which this type of model is
used to explain the spread of an actual idea through the network.
As a general matter, our purpose in presenting the model is not to
definitively characterize the spread of ideas among this class of legal elites.
Indeed, a complete model of such phenomena would require far more detail
and a significant amount of supporting empirical data. Instead, the purpose is
to formalize the social spread of ideas, doctrines, and intellectual paradigms
using a simple model of diffusion.
While our analysis models structural position and its role in accelerating
or decelerating particular ideas, one open question is whether historically
elite institutions are the generators of new approaches or simply the ratifiers
of such ideas once offered. In other words, are historically elite institutions
the real innovators? Are historically elite institutions engaging in “intellectual
arbitrage” or are they using the previously developed market power to mimic
the approaches undertaken by upstarts? Are Harvard and Yale more likely
to be the initial generators of novel approaches to the understanding of law
or are they simply institutions that act to accelerate the acceptance of these
approaches once offered by actors at other institutions?
Casual observation indicates a somewhat mixed record. For example,
consider several relatively recent intellectual movements within the legal
academy including critical legal studies, law and society, evolutionary analysis
and law, law as a complex system, empirical legal studies, and law and
economics. While the members of the Harvard and Yale faculty were early
adopters of some of these intellectual movements, it is clear that several of
these paradigms trace their origins to institutions with a less central structural
position. Initial generators of these successful intellectual movements come
from institutions such as Chicago, Cornell, Florida State, George Mason,
Indiana-Bloomington, Wisconsin, Washington University, and Vanderbilt.
55.

In the interest of clarity and parsimony, our model does not account for the impact of
institution B having many individuals from institution A, but simulations from a model
with these features, not presented here, showed qualitatively similar results. This similarity
makes intuitive sense, as the schools in our network which place individuals widely also, by
and large, place the most individuals overall.
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The Model
The graph G previously depicted in Figure 2 features nodes ni ={n1, n2,…
n184} and directed edges ei ={e1, e2,…e7240}. A directed graph such as G can be
represented as a weighted adjacency matrix whereby aij represents a count of
the number of edges from vertex i to vertex j. Alternatively, directed graph
G can be represented as a binary adjacency matrix whereby aij = 1 if there
exists any edge connecting node i to node j, and 0 otherwise. For the sake of
parsimony, our model adopts the binary construction.56
The model is initially considered at g = 0, where g equals the current generation
or time period. Using the binary adjacency matrix, our model releases idea d
at g = 0. We classify adopters of idea d as active and non-adopters as inactive.
For a single run of the model, idea d has a fixed infectiousness level, p, on the
interval (0,1].57 The infectiousness level p accounts for the intrinsic appeal of
the idea to the broader population, where p = 1 when the idea infects every
individual contacted with the particular idea.
Beginning with a selected ni, the model processes the complete set of n≠i by
sweeping the ni row of the adjacency matrix to determine the subset of nodes
in the graph G directly reachable from ni. With the previously fixed probability
p, idea d is transmitted to the direct neighbors of ni. Any neighbors reached
by idea d are saved such that for each subsequent g, the process repeats and
additional nodes are reached, until there remain no additional reachable
nodes from any node n infected with idea d. In the given generation g where
the process terminates, a count of total nodes reached by idea d is recorded.
The process described above was implemented in the programming
language Python.58 We repeatedly simulated the diffusion process for the
184 institutions contained in our network. In order to provide fairly robust
estimates of the reach of the diffusion process, we ran five hundred separate
diffusion trials at varying levels of p for each institution. Figure 6 contains
the consensus diffusion plot for five representative institutions—Harvard,
Washington University, South Carolina, Hamline and Southern Illinois.
In Figure 6, infectiousness p increases along the x axis as the number of
schools reached by idea d increases along the y axis. The structural position of
various institutions produces separation between institutions whose diffusion
prospects are exponential, linear, and sub-linear. Namely, for some institutions,
increases in the number of institutions reached by idea d scale linearly with
56.

If anything, this decision should provide conservative estimates of historically elite schools,
as these schools often place multiple faculty members at a given institution.

57.

As noted earlier, differential host susceptibility, while often considered in the epidemiology
literature, is not explicitly part of this model.

58.

As we believe replication is a hallmark of the scientific enterprise, we will happily provide our
Python code upon request. A Netlogo based implementation of the model is also available
in the online supplement: http://computationallegalstudies.com/jle-law-prof-article/.
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changes in the value of p. Yet, for many historically elite institutions diffusion
is exponentially accelerated by their respective structural position within the
broader network topology.59
Figure 6. Computational Simulation of Diffusion Based on the
Structure of the American Legal Academy

VI. Conclusion
Extant scholarship has long considered topics such as the intersection of law
and politics, including the appropriate role for the judiciary in a constitutional
democracy.60 Less often considered are the institutions collectively responsible
for training and initially socializing nearly every lawyer and judge in the
United States. While some argue that the modeling of large-scale social
processes such as the rise of intellectual paradigms or the emergence of new
59.

Appendix II offers an alternative presentation of the model. The x-axis displays the
minimum transmission probability needed for each law school to infect s percent of all other
schools, when that school is the only one infected and all others are susceptible at t = 0. The
y-axis position of the school is its rank when s = 90 percent (denoted by a filled circle), where
the school with the lowest minimum value of p is highest-ranked. The corresponding values
of p for s = 50 percent and 25 percent are marked by "x" and "+", respectively.

60.

E.g., Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1958); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme
Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge 1993).
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doctrinal approaches is analytically intractable, we believe it is possible to
leverage developments in computational social science to better understand
the mechanics of these phenomena.
There are undoubtedly a wide variety of actors and institutions whose
complex interactions work to produce changes in the common law. We hope
our analysis motivates additional theoretical and empirical analysis of legal
socialization and its role in structuring the bounds of collective conception.
In other words, despite the possibility that some subset of relevant social
process might be difficult to define, we believe the inquiry into the machinery
of cultural replication—mechanics classically described by scholars such as
Duncan Kennedy—should continue.61 The wider literature offers concrete
descriptions of instances where the legal academy directly impacted the
development of the American common law.62 Building from this work, we
believe studying the self-organization of such legal elites and their channels of
diffusion is an important piece of a larger effort to move legal science toward
a first law of jurisdynamics.
61.

See Kennedy, supra note 54.

62.

E.g., Mark Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil
Libertarianism (University of California 1991); and Brandwein, supra note 3 (2007).
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Appendix 1. A Sample of the Data Set
School of
Professorship

School
ID

Professor Name

School of First
American Law
Degree

Law
Degree|
School
ID

University of
Michigan

9

Alicia_Davis_
Evans

J.D. Yale

1

University of
Louisville

99

Jim_Chen

J.D. Harvard

1

Florida State
University

55

JB_Ruhl

J.D. Virginia

11

University of
Virginia

11

G_Edward_
White

J.D. Harvard

2

Cornell University

13

Michael_Heise

J.D. Chicago

6

University of
Arizona

45

Ana_Maria_
Merico

J.D. Michigan

9

Emory University

22

Frederick_Tung

J.D. Harvard

2

University of TexasAustin

18

Sanford_Levinson J.D. Stanford

3

Rutgers UniversityCamden

71

Robert_F_
Williams

J.D. Florida

50

University of
Wisconsin

33

Elizabeth_Mertz

J.D.
Northwestern

12

University of
Pennsylvania

7

Christopher_S_
Yoo

J.D.
Northwestern

12

Mercer University

100

Ted_Blumoff

J.D. Washington
Univ.

19

Stanford University

3

Pamela_Karlan

J.D. Yale

1
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Appendix II: Infectiousness Level P Necessary to Saturate
the S percent Threshold of the Network
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